美国历史好的进!急求!!!英文的资料也没有关系!
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发布时间：2022-04-24 02:05
共4个回答
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision which concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to free speech against the draft ring World War I. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist party and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing 15,000 leaflets to men eligible for the draft that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn ty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Ultimately, the case served as the founding of the "clear and present danger" rule.
Clear and present danger
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
For the book, see Clear and Present Danger. For its film adaptation, see Clear and Present Danger (film).
Clear and present danger is a term used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the unanimous opinion for the case Schenck v. United States,[1] concerning the ability of the government to regulate speech against the draft ring World War I:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be enred so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech[2][3] and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was later modified by Brandenburg v. Ohio,[4] and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an imminent lawless action.
The vast majority of legal scholars have concluded that in writing the Schenck opinion Justice Holmes never meant to replace the "bad tendency" test which had been established in the 1868 English case R. v. Hicklin and incorporated into American jurisprudence in the 1904 Supreme Court case U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams. This is demonstrated by the use of the word "tendency" in Schenck itself, a paragraph in Schenck explaining that the success of speech in causing the actual harm was not a prerequisite for conviction, and use of the bad-tendency test in the simultaneous Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States decisions (both of which cite Schenck without using the words "clear and present danger").
However, a subsequent essay by Zechariah Chafee entitled “Freedom of Speech in War Time” argued despite context that Holmes had intended to substitute clear and present danger for the bad-tendency standard a more protective standard of free speech.[5] Bad tendency was a far more ambiguous standard where speech could be punished even in the absence of identifiable danger, and as such was strongly opposed by the fledgling ACLU and other libertarians of the time.
Having read Chafee's article, Holmes decided to retroactively reinterpret what he had meant by "clear and present danger" and accepted Chafee's characterization of the new test in his dissent in Abrams v. United States just six months after Schenck.[6] Significantly unlike Abrams, the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs had all proced unanimous decisions. Justice Brandeis soon began citing the "clear and present danger" test in his concurrences, but the new standard was not accepted by the full court until its official adoption in Brandenburg v. Ohio fifty years later.
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
找了半天,没找到.只找到下面这个地址.是关于二战美国*言论自由的一片论文.不知道你有用没有,帮不上忙了,呵呵,没办法.
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=149430
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
蒋介石。叫 不抵抗。正面多。东北全部沦陷了
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision which concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to free speech against the draft ring World War I. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist party and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing 15,000 leaflets to men eligible for the draft that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn ty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Ultimately, the case served as the founding of the "clear and present danger" rule.
Clear and present danger
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
For the book, see Clear and Present Danger. For its film adaptation, see Clear and Present Danger (film).
Clear and present danger is a term used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the unanimous opinion for the case Schenck v. United States,[1] concerning the ability of the government to regulate speech against the draft ring World War I:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be enred so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech[2][3] and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was later modified by Brandenburg v. Ohio,[4] and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an imminent lawless action.
The vast majority of legal scholars have concluded that in writing the Schenck opinion Justice Holmes never meant to replace the "bad tendency" test which had been established in the 1868 English case R. v. Hicklin and incorporated into American jurisprudence in the 1904 Supreme Court case U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams. This is demonstrated by the use of the word "tendency" in Schenck itself, a paragraph in Schenck explaining that the success of speech in causing the actual harm was not a prerequisite for conviction, and use of the bad-tendency test in the simultaneous Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States decisions (both of which cite Schenck without using the words "clear and present danger").
However, a subsequent essay by Zechariah Chafee entitled “Freedom of Speech in War Time” argued despite context that Holmes had intended to substitute clear and present danger for the bad-tendency standard a more protective standard of free speech.[5] Bad tendency was a far more ambiguous standard where speech could be punished even in the absence of identifiable danger, and as such was strongly opposed by the fledgling ACLU and other libertarians of the time.
Having read Chafee's article, Holmes decided to retroactively reinterpret what he had meant by "clear and present danger" and accepted Chafee's characterization of the new test in his dissent in Abrams v. United States just six months after Schenck.[6] Significantly unlike Abrams, the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs had all proced unanimous decisions. Justice Brandeis soon began citing the "clear and present danger" test in his concurrences, but the new standard was not accepted by the full court until its official adoption in Brandenburg v. Ohio fifty years later.
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
麦肯锡法案？？？？？？？？？？？？！！！！！！！！！！！
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
找了半天,没找到.只找到下面这个地址.是关于二战美国*言论自由的一片论文.不知道你有用没有,帮不上忙了,呵呵,没办法.
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=149430
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
蒋介石。叫 不抵抗。正面多。东北全部沦陷了
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
麦肯锡法案？？？？？？？？？？？？！！！！！！！！！！！
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision which concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to free speech against the draft ring World War I. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist party and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing 15,000 leaflets to men eligible for the draft that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn ty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Ultimately, the case served as the founding of the "clear and present danger" rule.
Clear and present danger
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
For the book, see Clear and Present Danger. For its film adaptation, see Clear and Present Danger (film).
Clear and present danger is a term used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the unanimous opinion for the case Schenck v. United States,[1] concerning the ability of the government to regulate speech against the draft ring World War I:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be enred so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech[2][3] and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was later modified by Brandenburg v. Ohio,[4] and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an imminent lawless action.
The vast majority of legal scholars have concluded that in writing the Schenck opinion Justice Holmes never meant to replace the "bad tendency" test which had been established in the 1868 English case R. v. Hicklin and incorporated into American jurisprudence in the 1904 Supreme Court case U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams. This is demonstrated by the use of the word "tendency" in Schenck itself, a paragraph in Schenck explaining that the success of speech in causing the actual harm was not a prerequisite for conviction, and use of the bad-tendency test in the simultaneous Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States decisions (both of which cite Schenck without using the words "clear and present danger").
However, a subsequent essay by Zechariah Chafee entitled “Freedom of Speech in War Time” argued despite context that Holmes had intended to substitute clear and present danger for the bad-tendency standard a more protective standard of free speech.[5] Bad tendency was a far more ambiguous standard where speech could be punished even in the absence of identifiable danger, and as such was strongly opposed by the fledgling ACLU and other libertarians of the time.
Having read Chafee's article, Holmes decided to retroactively reinterpret what he had meant by "clear and present danger" and accepted Chafee's characterization of the new test in his dissent in Abrams v. United States just six months after Schenck.[6] Significantly unlike Abrams, the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs had all proced unanimous decisions. Justice Brandeis soon began citing the "clear and present danger" test in his concurrences, but the new standard was not accepted by the full court until its official adoption in Brandenburg v. Ohio fifty years later.
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
找了半天,没找到.只找到下面这个地址.是关于二战美国*言论自由的一片论文.不知道你有用没有,帮不上忙了,呵呵,没办法.
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=149430
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
蒋介石。叫 不抵抗。正面多。东北全部沦陷了
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
麦肯锡法案？？？？？？？？？？？？！！！！！！！！！！！
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision which concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to free speech against the draft ring World War I. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist party and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing 15,000 leaflets to men eligible for the draft that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn ty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." Ultimately, the case served as the founding of the "clear and present danger" rule.
Clear and present danger
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
For the book, see Clear and Present Danger. For its film adaptation, see Clear and Present Danger (film).
Clear and present danger is a term used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the unanimous opinion for the case Schenck v. United States,[1] concerning the ability of the government to regulate speech against the draft ring World War I:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be enred so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Following Schenck v. United States, "clear and present danger" became both a public metaphor for First Amendment speech[2][3] and a standard test in cases before the Court where a United States law limits a citizen's First Amendment rights; the law is deemed to be constitutional if it can be shown that the language it prohibits poses a "clear and present danger". However, the "clear and present danger" criterion of the Schenck decision was later modified by Brandenburg v. Ohio,[4] and the test refined to determining whether the speech would provoke an imminent lawless action.
The vast majority of legal scholars have concluded that in writing the Schenck opinion Justice Holmes never meant to replace the "bad tendency" test which had been established in the 1868 English case R. v. Hicklin and incorporated into American jurisprudence in the 1904 Supreme Court case U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams. This is demonstrated by the use of the word "tendency" in Schenck itself, a paragraph in Schenck explaining that the success of speech in causing the actual harm was not a prerequisite for conviction, and use of the bad-tendency test in the simultaneous Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States decisions (both of which cite Schenck without using the words "clear and present danger").
However, a subsequent essay by Zechariah Chafee entitled “Freedom of Speech in War Time” argued despite context that Holmes had intended to substitute clear and present danger for the bad-tendency standard a more protective standard of free speech.[5] Bad tendency was a far more ambiguous standard where speech could be punished even in the absence of identifiable danger, and as such was strongly opposed by the fledgling ACLU and other libertarians of the time.
Having read Chafee's article, Holmes decided to retroactively reinterpret what he had meant by "clear and present danger" and accepted Chafee's characterization of the new test in his dissent in Abrams v. United States just six months after Schenck.[6] Significantly unlike Abrams, the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs had all proced unanimous decisions. Justice Brandeis soon began citing the "clear and present danger" test in his concurrences, but the new standard was not accepted by the full court until its official adoption in Brandenburg v. Ohio fifty years later.
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:20
找了半天,没找到.只找到下面这个地址.是关于二战美国*言论自由的一片论文.不知道你有用没有,帮不上忙了,呵呵,没办法.
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=149430
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
蒋介石。叫 不抵抗。正面多。东北全部沦陷了
热心网友
时间：2023-10-20 20:21
麦肯锡法案？？？？？？？？？？？？！！！！！！！！！！！
